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STATUTORY CRIMINAL PRESUMPTIONS: PROOF
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT?
N. HUNTLEY HOLLAND* AND HARVEY H. CHAMBERLIN**
The statutory criminal presumption has become a popular device
in criminal proceedings, often enabling the prosecutor to prove elements
of an offense and get his case to the jury in circumstances where he
might otherwise be unable to do so. Many such presumptions, however,
are clearly inconsistent with the standard of reasonable doubt and the
presumption of innocence. This inconsistency will be explored in the
following discussion. Before doing so, however, it seems appropriate to
detail the nature and effect of the reasonable doubt standard and the
presumption of innocence.
THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
Professor Wigmore tells us that the presumption of innocence is
"fixed in our law."' The presumption has found expression in many
state criminal codes,2 and most courts have held that it must be included
in the instructions to the jury.' The United States Supreme Court has
held that federal courts must instruct criminal juries on the presumption
of innocence.' In a recent case, the Court described the presumption as
a "bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement
lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.' ",5 The
presumption of innocence is not actually a presumption in the legal
sense that once an underlying fact is proved, another (presumed) fact
may be taken as proved. Nor is it a presumption in the popular sense
or an inference based on probability, for it is a fact that more persons
charged with crime are convicted than acquitted. McCormick explains
the presumption:
* Member of the Washington Bar.
** Law student, University of Washington.
I. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2511, at 406 (3d ed. 1940).
2. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.58.020 (1961).
3. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 806 (2d ed. 1972).
4. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895). But cf. United States v. Agnew, 165 U.S.
36 (1897).
5. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
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The phrase is probably better called the 'assumption of inno-
cence' in that it describes our assumption that, in the absence
of contrary facts, it is assumed that any person's conduct upon
a given occasion was lawful.'
Professor Fletcher states that the presumption of innocence first
appeared in civil cases, and developed independently of the reasonable
doubt standard.7 It was not until the 1850's, he says, that American
judges began to equate the presumption with the rule on the prosecutor's
burden of persuasion.' Today, however, the presumption is regarded
simply as another way of stating the rule that the prosecutor must prove
the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.' While some
contend that it is an unnecessary amplification of the prosecutor's bur-
den of persuasion, 0 it should not be discarded. The presumption, like
the reasonable doubt standard, serves a special purpose by indicating to
the jury that if a mistake is to be made it should be made in favor of
the defendant, and that above all, guilt should not be inferred from the
indictment."
6. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 805-06. Judge Alexander, in Carr v. State, 192 Miss. 152,
153, 4 So. 2d 887, 888 (1941), agreed:
In the first place, the so-called presumption of innocence is not, strictly speaking, a
presumption in the sense of an inference deduced from a given premise. It is more accur-
ately an assumption which has for its purpose the placing of the burden of proof upon
anyone who asserts any deviation from the socially desirable ideal of good moral conduct.
Professor Slovenko adds:
The conception of man in the Common Law is that he is good, innocent of crime or evil
until proved the contrary by legal evidence. He is presumed to have a natural inclination
to be a friend of all other men; he is not considered to be an enemy of man. The Common
Law does not follow Thomas Hobbes in his assumption of the basic hostility between men.
Slovenko, Establishing the Guilt of the Accused, 31 TUL. L. REV. 173 (1956).
7. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion
Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880 n.2 (1968).
8. Id.
9. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 806.
10. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 649 (1954); WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 406.
It. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 881; MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 806; J. THAYER, A PRELIMI-
NARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 565 (1898); H. Packer, Two Models of the
Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1964). Wigmore states:
[11n a criminal case the term does convey a special and perhaps useful hint, over and
above the other form of the rule about the burden of proof [reasonable doubt], in that it
cautions the jury to put away from their minds all the suspicion that arises from the arrest,
the indictment, and the arraignment, and to reach their conclusion solely from the legal
evidence adduced. In other words, the rule about burden of proof requires the prosecution
by evidence to convince the jury of the accused's guilt; while the presumption of innocence,
too, requires this, but conveys for the jury a special and additional caution (which is
perhaps only an implied corollary to the other) to consider, in the material for their belief,
nothing but the evidence, i.e., no surmises based on the present situation of the accused.
WIGMORE, supra note 1, at 407.
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Whether one regards the presumption of innocence as merely a
restatement of the reasonable doubt standard or a separate principle in
itself, the two principles are so closely intertwined that if one is given
constitutional stature, it follows that the other should be afforded equal
treatment. Thus, since the reasonable doubt standard has been declared
an essential element of due process, 2 it follows that the presumption of
innocence is also of constitutional dimension. The Supreme Court has
twice stated that the presumption's "enforcement lies at the foundation
of the administration of our law."' 3 The presumption also seems im-
plicit in the eighth amendment protection against excessive bail. 4
PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
From early times, those who prized freedom have required a strong
justification for condemning a defendant and depriving him of either his
life or liberty. The minimal demand is that the state punish only those
who have contravened the law. This concern for the dignity of the
individual has been manifested in various rubrics. It prompted Hale to
proclaim that it is better to acquit five guilty men than to convict one
who is innocent. 5 It also found expression in the presumption of inno-
cence, and later in the rule that the prosecution must prove the de-
fendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
McCormick says that the demand for a higher burden of persua-
sion in criminal cases than in civil cases has roots in antiquity. 6 This
demand first appeared in the form of the reasonable doubt standard
about 1798.11 Because of the "nearly complete and long-standing accept-
ance"' 8 of the standard by states in criminal trials, it was not until 1970
that the United States Supreme Court had occasion to give it constitu-
tional stature.' In In re Winship,20 the Court stated:
12. See notes 15-25 infra and accompanying text.
13. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). The Court also noted the principle in the early
case of Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). There are also references to the
presumption of innocence in several other Supreme Court opinions. See, e.g., Deutsch v. United
States, 365 U.S. 456, 471 (1961); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 363 (1950); Sinclair
v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 296-97 (1928); Dunlap v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 502 (1897);
Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 266 (1877).
14. Slovenko, supra note 6, at 174.
15. M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 289 (1964); G. WILLIAMS, PROOF OF GUILT 186-90
(3d ed. 1963).
16. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 799.
17. Id.
18. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring).
19. There are, however, references to the reasonable doubt standard in several earlier opin-
ions. For example, in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952), Mr. Justice Frankfurter said
in dissent that "it is the duty of the Government to establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
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The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the Ameri-
can scheme of criminal procedure ...
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stat-
ure of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that
the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.2'
The reason the law demands a higher burden of persuasion in
criminal than in civil trials bears repeating. The purpose of civil litiga-
tion is to arrive at an efficient and fair settlement of a dispute. For this
reason it is viewed as no more serious for there to be an error in the
defendant's favor than in the plaintiff's. 2 Accordingly, a standard
based on probabilities, such as the preponderance of the evidence rule,
is appropriate for such cases. But in the criminal context, the social
disutility of convicting an innocent man is not equivalent to acquitting
one who is guilty. The problem, then, in a criminal trial is not one of
reaching a fair settlement but of justifying the use of the state's coercive
powers to condemn and punish. Because the potential loss is so much
greater in criminal than in civil trials, the risk of factual error must
accordingly be reduced. The rule that the prosecution must prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is based on an attempt to
reduce this risk of error to a minimum.
The Supreme Court's decision in Winship calls for a reassessment
of some practices concerning the allocation of burdens of proof.2 3 It
In Brineger v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949), the Court said that "guilt in a criminal
case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Finally, in Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S.
84, 89 (1949), it was noted that "[a]n essential part of a procedure which can be said fairly to inflict
• . .punishment is that all elements of the crime charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt." It should be noted that the comments in the latter two cases were made in dictum. See
also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 138
(1954); Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1914); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245,
253 (1910); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S.
304, 312 (1881); United States v. McGlue, 26 F. Cas. 1093 (No. 15,679) (C.C.D. Mass. 1851).
20. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
21. Id. at 363-64.
22. Id. at 371.
23. The term "burden of proof' encompasses two separate burdens of proof. Professor
McCormick states:
One burden is that of producing evidence, satisfactory to the judge, of a particular fact in
issue. [This is often labelled the "burden of production."] The second is the burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true. [This is generally labelled the
"burden of persuasion."]
MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 783-84.
[Vol. 7
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seems that our criminal law has not fully accepted the notion that
acquittal should result whenever reasonable doubt as to guilt exists, in
the sense that it demands proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to some
issues, but not as to all.24 Thus there is a range of issues on which the
defendant is not given the benefit of any residual doubt. 5 As noted
earlier, there is another similar inconsistency in our criminal law that
deserves analysis. This is the inconsistency between the reasonable
doubt standard (and presumption of innocence) and statutory criminal
presumptions.
STATUTORY CRIMINAL PRESUMPTIONS
At common law, presumptions, such as the inference of guilt from
possession of stolen property, " were developed to aid the prosecution.
Around the turn of the century, legislatively-created presumptions be-
came a popular device for aiding prosecutors. 7 Today, statutory crimi-
nal presumptions form an integral part of our criminal law. Their popu-
larity has been termed "an instinctive response to counterbalance the
expanding constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants by
the courts."2 This may be true. But while legislatures may be showing
less concern for the reasonable doubt standard (and presumption of
innocence), the Supreme Court has fairly recently reevaluated its ap-
proach to the validity of statutory criminal presumptions. 9 This reap-
praisal is consistent with a current tendency to favor defendants with
respect to the burden of proof.'"
As noted earlier, criminal presumptions often allow the prosecu-
tor to get his case to the jury in circumstances where he might other-
24. Fletcher, supra note 7.
25. Id. at 883.
26. WIGMORE, supra note I, § 2513, at 417.
27. Chamberlain, Legislative Corrections in Criminal Procedure, 13 A.B.A.J. 703 (1927).
28. Note, Statutory Criminal Presumption: Judicial Sleight of Hand, 53 VA. L. REV. 702
(1967).
29. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
30. For an excellent account of how this trend has influenced the defendant's position with
regard to the affirmative defenses, see Fletcher, supra note 7. See also MCCORMICK, supra note 3,
at 802.
The [presumption] statutes have helped the prosecuting officer by allowing him to show
in evidence facts which are comparatively easy of proof and then permitting the jury to
draw inferences . . . from the facts proven.
Chamberlain, Presumption as First Aid to the District Attorney, 14 A.B.A.J. 287 (1928). Professor
Slovenko says plainly that presumptions are "procedural device[s] to supply a deficiency." Slov-
enko, supra note 6, at 175.
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wise be unable to do so. As well as in aiding convictions, they provide
an incentive to the defendant to produce evidence."
The term "presumption" is only a general label and does not de-
scribe the operative effect of a particular provision. Professor Thayer
provides a good general definition of the term "presumption":
Presumptions are aids to reasoning and argumentation, which
assume the truth of certain matters for the purpose of some
given inquiry. They may be grounded on general experience, or
probability of any kind; or merely on policy and conveni-
ence.
3 2
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE TYPES OF STATUTORY
PRESUMPTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
Statutory criminal presumptions may be classified according to
two sets of criteria. First, presumptions may be classified according to
their evidentiary effect. A conclusive presumption precludes argument
on an issue once certain operative facts have been proved. The facts
proved may be disputed, but their evidentiary effect in creating the
presumed fact may not. The authorities are virtually unanimous in hold-
ing that a conclusive presumption is not a presumption at all, but a
substantive rule of law.3 3 A mandatory presumption has the eviden-
tiary effect of compelling the jury to find the presumed fact if the proved
fact is believed and the accused does not come forward with evidence
rebutting the presumed fact.34 However, the jury is not compelled to
find the presumed fact once rebutting evidence has been introduced by
the defendant. Because of the harshness of the procedure, statutory
presumptions of this character have seldom been employed in the crimi-
nal law.35 A permissive presumption permits, but does not require, the
jury to find the presumed fact upon proof of the operative fact.3 1
31. It has been argued that this "encouragement" is a violation of the fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 71-88 (1965) (Justices
Black and Douglas dissenting); Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Reconciling the
Practical with the Sacrosanct, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 157, 174-77 (1970).
32. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 314 (1898).
33. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 804; Brosman, The Statutory Presumptions, 5 TUL. L.
REV. 17, 24 (1930); Soules, Presumptions in Criminal Cases, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 277, 278-79
(1968); Morgan, How to Approach Burden of Proof and Presumptions, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV.
34 (1952).
34. Stumbo, Presumptions-A View at Chaos, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 182, 189 (1964).
35. Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 141, 142 (1966). The reporter for the Model Penal Code proposed the use of foreclosure, but
his suggestion was not followed. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
36. See MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 831; United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 70 (1965);
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1970).
[Vol. 7
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Second, mandatory presumptions may be classified according to
whether they shift either the burden of going forward with the evidence
as to the existence of the presumed fact, or the burden of persuasion,
or both.
Only permissive presumptions are found in criminal statutes. 7 To
allow a conclusive or mandatory presumption to operate against a crim-
inal defendant on an element of the crime would violate his right to be
free from a directed verdict of guilty." This right precludes the court
from even directing the jury to find against the defendant on an element
of the crime. 9
The notion is that for the court to decide that all elements, or
that a single element, of the crime exist would improperly
invade the province of the jury, which in fact if not in theory
has the power to disregard the applicable law given it by the
court by finding, in favor of the defendant, that an element
does not exist even when it knows very well that it does exist.40
Thus, the only permissible evidentiary effect of a statutory criminal
presumption is to establish a prima facie case for the prosecution allow-
ing, but not requiring, the jury to infer the presumed fact from proof of
the operative fact. Once the operative facts are proved and the presump-
tion attaches, the case must go to the jury-there can be no directed
verdict of acquittal.41 Assuming that all other elements of the crime have
been proved as well-even in the absence of any rebuttal evidence by
the accused-the jury may acquit; the defendant does not, strictly
speaking, have the burden of producing evidence to overcome the pre-
37. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 831.
38. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947);
Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). Conclusive and mandatory presumptions
also infringe upon the defendant's right to a jury trial. See authorities cited supra note 36.
39. United States v. Manuszak, 234 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1956); Konda v. United States, 166
F. 91 (7th Cir. 1908).
40. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 53 (1972).
41. There is language in United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 68 (1965), which is seemingly
to the contrary:
Our Constitution places in the hands of the trial judge the responsibility for safeguarding
the integrity of the jury trial, including the right to have a case withheld from the jury
when the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction.
While this language gives the trial judge the power to keep a case from the jury when the evidence
is insufficient, it means no more than that the rational connection test must be met with regard to
statutory criminal presumptions. Once the test is met and the operative fact is proved, there is
sufficient evidence to establish the presumed fact.
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sumption. As a practical matter, however, he will probably be convicted
if he fails to offer rebuttal evidence. 42
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF STATUTORY
PRESUMPTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE RATIONAL CONNECTION
TEST
Due process principles not only prohibit the use of certain types of
presumptions in criminal prosecution, but also set limits upon the use
of the permitted presumptions. Prior to its 1943 decision in Tot v.
United States,43 the Supreme Court took the position that there was
no single test for determining the constitutionality of statutory presump-
tions. The Court felt that
[t]he decisive considerations are too variable, too much distinc-
tions of degree, too dependent in last analysis upon a common
sense estimate of fairness or of facilities of proof, to be
crowded into a formula."
In Tot, the Court established the "rational connection" test as the
constitutional standard for judging statutory criminal presumptions.
The defendant in Tot was convicted under a provision of the Federal
Firearms Control Act making it unlawful for one previously convicted
of a crime of violence to receive any firearm in interstate commerce. The
statute created a presumption that the firearm was received in interstate
commerce in violation of the Act from possession of a firearm by one
previously convicted of a violent crime. The Court struck down this
presumption as violative of due process, stating:
Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sus-
tained if there be no rational connection between the fact
proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the
one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of
connection between the two in common experience. This is not
to say that a valid presumption may not be created upon a view
of relation broader than that a jury might take in a specific
case. But where the inference is strained as not to have a rea-
sonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know it, it
is not competent for the legislature to create it as a rule govern-
ing the procedure of courts.45
42. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 71-78 (1965) (Justices Black and Douglas
dissenting).
43. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
44. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 91 (1934).
45. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943).
[Vol. 7
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The Court found that, although state firearms laws made acquisition
difficult, it did not necessarily follow from proof of possession that the
firearms were received in interstate commerce subsequent to the adop-
tion of the federal act. The firearms possessed by defendant could have
been acquired intrastate in violation of state law or received in interstate
commerce prior to the adoption of the federal act.
The Court's treatment of two earlier tests used to judge statutory
presumptions was as significant as its adoption of the rational connec-
tion test. The first, the "greater includes the lesser" test, was never
applied in a criminal setting. Its only use came in 1928 in Ferry v.
Ramsey.46 There Mr. Justice Holmes devised the rule that if the state
could constitutionally enact a criminal statute which did not require
proof of the presumed fact, then the presumption was constitutional.
The statute in Ferry imposed liability upon bank directors who, know-
ing of their bank's insolvency, assented to the reception of deposits. The
statute further provided that proof of insolvency should be prima facie
evidence of the directors' knowledge and assent. The Supreme Court
upheld the presumption, stating:
It is said that the liability is founded by the statute upon the
directors' assent to the deposit and that when this is the ground
the assent cannot be proved by artificial presumptions that
have no warrant from experience. But the short answer is that
the statute might have made the directors personally liable to
the depositors in every case, if it had been so minded, and that
if it had purported to do so, whoever accepted the office would
assume the risk. The statute in short imposed a liability that
was less than might have been imposed, and that being so, the
thing to be considered is the result reached, not the possibly
inartful or clumsy way of reaching it."
The Holmes reasoning was completely rejected in Tot as inapplicable
to a criminal prosecution. 8
The second test, the "comparative convenience" test, was first pro-
posed in dicta in Morrison v. California.9 Essentially, the test is whether
"it would be more convenient for the defendant or for the prosecution
to adduce evidence of the presumed fact."5 In Morrison the Court held
46. 277 U.S. 88 (1928).
47. Id. at 94.
48. 319 U.S. at 472.
49. 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
50. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 33 n.56 (1969).
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invalid a statute making it unlawful to conspire to place an alien in
possession of land. The statute placed the burden of production and the
burden of persuasion as to the citizenship of the co-conspirator with the
defendant. In Tot the Court reduced the comparative convenience test
to the status of a "corollary" to the rational connection test:"1 "The
argument from convenience is admissible only where the inference is a
permissible one . . .and . . .will not subject him to unfairness or
hardship.152
In two important cases decided in 1965, the Supreme Court further
explained the rational connection test. In United States v. Gainey,53 the
defendant was convicted of violating a statute making it unlawful to
operate an unbonded still. The statute included a presumption making
presence at an unregistered still sufficient evidence on which to convict
a defendant of the crime of carrying on the business of distilling without
giving bond unless the defendant was able to explain his presence to the
satisfaction of the jury. The Court upheld the conviction on the ground
that it was well-known that bootleggers hid their stills and that very few
people were likely to be found at the hidden sites unless they were parties
to the illegal activity.54 This created a sufficient rational connection
between presence at the site of an illegal still and participation in the
illegal activity to sustain the presumption.
A few months later in United States v. Romano,55 the Court held
unconstitutional a presumption identical to that in Gainey with regard
to the companion offense of possession of an unbonded still. The pre-
sumption made presence at the site of the still sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for possession of the still. The Court found that
possession of the still was only one of several possible reasons for the
defendant's presence at the distilling site. Whereas "participation" in
illegal distilling (the offense in Gainey) was likely to explain one's pres-
ence at the distilling site, "possession" was only one of several activities
amounting to "participation." Therefore, a constitutionally sufficient
51. 319 U.S. at 467.
52. Id. at 469-70.
53. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
54. The Court noted that:
Congress was undoubtedly aware that manufacturers of illegal liquors are notorious for
the deftness with which they locate arcane spots for plying their trade. Legislative recogni-
tion of the implications of seclusions only confirms what the folklore teaches-that strang-
ers to the illegal business rarely penetrate the curtain of secrecy.
380 U.S. at 67-68.
55. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
[Vol, 7
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rational connection between the accused's presence and his presumed
possession was lacking. 6
In Romano, the Court again rejected the "greater includes the
lesser" test advanced in Tot, but this time more explicitly:
It may be, of course, that Congress has the power to make
presence at an illegal still a punishable crime, but we find no
clear indication that it intended to so exercise this power. The
crime remains possession, not presence, and, with all due defer-
ence to the judgment of Congress, the former may not constitu-
tionally be inferred from the latter.57
Tot, Gainey and Romano left important questions unanswered. To
begin with, "rational connection" is a vague term, susceptible to more
than one meaning. It was unclear whether "rational connection" meant
no more than that the operative fact must be relevant to the presumed
fact, regardless of how slightly it raises its probability, or whether it was
a test of probative significance. If it was the latter, it was unclear what
level of probability was required to sustain a presumption. It was not
until 1969, in Leary v. United States," that the Court eliminated some
of the vagueness associated with "rational connection" and gave the test
a more precise meaning.
The petitioner, Dr. Timothy Leary, was driving from New York
to Mexico when he was denied entry by Mexican customs officials and
had to return to Texas. In Texas, American customs officials discovered
marijuana in Leary's automobile. He was subsequently indicted and,
after a jury trial, convicted of knowingly transporting and concealing
marijuana with knowledge that it had been illegally imported into the
United States. The statute under which Leary was indicted included a
presumption permitting the jury to infer from the defendant's possession
of marijuana his knowledge that it had been illegally imported into the
56. The Court stated:
Presence tells us only that the defendant was there and very likely played a part in the
illicit scheme. But presence tells us nothing about what the defendant's specific function
was and carries no legitimate, rational or reasonable inference that he was engaged in one
of the specialized functions connected with possession, rather than in one of the supply,
delivery or operational activities having nothing to do with possession. Presence is relevant
and admissible evidence in a trial on a possession charge; but absent some showing of the
defendant's function at the still, its connection with possession is too tenuous to permit a
reasonable inference of guilt-the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbi-
trary . . ..
382 U.S. at 141.
57. Id. at 144.
58. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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United States.59 The Court struck down the presumption as failing the
rational connection test. It concluded that, though scholarly studies
indicated that most domestically consumed marijuana is of foreign ori-
gin, this did not warrant the assumption that users of marijuana had
read the literature and deduced therefrom that their marijuana was
unlawfully imported. The presumption, said the Court, could be upheld
only if a very small amount of marijuana were domestically grown.
After reviewing the different means by which a possessor of marijuana
might learn of its foreign origin, the Court held that it was impossible
to say with "substantial assurance" that most possessors know their
marijuana to be illegally imported. The chief import of Leary lies in its
reformulation of the rational connection test. While purporting simply
to follow Tot, Gainey and Romano, the Court employed language defin-
ing a "rational connection" which "represents some stiffening of the
absolute minimum degree"' " of connection required to sustain a statu-
tory criminal presumption. The Court stated:
The upshot of Tot, Gainey and Romano is, we think, that a
criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as "irra-
tional" or "arbitrary", and hence unconstitutional, unless it
can at least be said with substantial assurance that the pre-
sumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact
on which it is made to depend."'
Neither Tot nor its progeny stated that a presumed fact must "more
likely than not" follow from proof of the operative fact. The language
in Tot did not foreclose a "more likely than not" test; therein the Court
said:
[W]here the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable
relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it is not
competent for the legislature to create it as a rule governing
the procedure of courts. 2
This sentence left open the possibility that a presumption short of "more
likely than not" but not excessively "strained" and having "a reasonable
relation to the circumstances of life" could still pass constitutional mus-
ter.
59. 21 U.S.C. § 176a (1964).
60. Note, Standards for Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 103, 106
(1969).
61. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969) (emphasis added).
62. 319 U.S. at 468.
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Leary is also significant for its requirement that the prosecution
carry the burden of persuading the trial and appellate court that one fact
is "more likely than not" to flow from proof of another fact. The Court
stated that "it was incumbent upon the prosecution to demonstrate that
the inference was permissible before the burden could be placed upon
the defendant." '" This marked a departure from earlier rational
connection cases decided by the courts of appeals. Out of deference to
Congress, those courts had effectively placed the burden of invalidating
the presumption upon defendants. "4
Leary was careful to say only that a statutory criminal presumption
must "at least" meet the "more likely than not" test. The Court did not
foreclose the possibility that, at a later date, it might set an even stricter
standard. Indeed, in a footnote, it was stated:
Since we find that the Para. 176a presumption is unconstitu-
tional under the standard ["more likely than not"], we need not
reach the question whether a criminal presumption which pas-
ses muster when so judged must also satisfy the criminal "rea-
sonable doubt" standard if proof of the crime charged or an
essential element thereof depends upon its use."'
A later intimation that the Court may be moving toward adoption
of a "beyond a reasonable doubt" test came in Turner v. United
States." There petitioner was charged and convicted on four counts of
federal narcotics violations. The first and third counts charged receipt
and concealment of heroin and cocaine with knowledge that the two
drugs had been illegally imported into the United States. The second
and fourth counts charged purchase or distribution of heroin and co-
caine removed from the original stamped package. Two presumptions
were involved. The first was identical to the presumption struck down
in Leary except that it dealt with heroin and cocaine rather than mari-
juana. The second provided that the absence of appropriate taxpaid
stamps from narcotic drugs found in the defendant's possession would
be prima facie evidence that he purchased or distributed the drugs re-
moved from the original stamped package. The Supreme Court af-
63. 395 U.S. at 45.
64. See, e.g., Costello v. United States, 324 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
930 (1964); United States v. Gibson, 310 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1962).
65. 395 U.S. at 36 n.64. There is also a faint suggestion in United States v. Romano,
382 U.S. 136, 144 (1965), that the rational connection test should require an inference meeting
the reasonable doubt standard.
66. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
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firmed the heroin convictions but reversed the convictions involving
cocaine. In doing so, the Court upheld both presumptions as applied to
heroin but invalidated the presumptions as applied to cocaine.
Because heroin cannot be legally produced in the United States and
because "the overwhelming evidence is that the heroin consumed in the
United States is illegally imported," the Court concluded that "[t]o
possess heroin is to possess imported heroin." 7 The Court then sus-
tained the presumption which inferred knowledge of the unlawful im-
portation from unexplained possession of heroin, stating:
Whether judged by the more-likely-than-not standard . . . or
by the more exacting reasonable-doubt standard normally
applicable in criminal cases .. . [the presumption] is valid
insofar as it permits a jury to infer that heroin possessed in this
country is a smuggled drug. 8
Because much more cocaine is lawfully produced in this country, the
Court invalidated the same presumption as applied to cocaine.69 It noted
that this presumption could not even be sustained under the "more
likely than not" test.7"
The presumption that possession establishes purchase or distribu-
tion of a drug removed from the original stamped package was sus-
tained as to heroin. There are no legally stamped packages in this
country and almost all heroin is obtained by purchase. The Court thus
concluded that "[tihere is no doubt that a possessor of heroin . . . did
not purchase the heroin in or from the original stamped package."',
Perhaps the most significant part of Turner was its invalidation of this
same presumption as applied to cocaine. Because of the availability of
the drug from legal sources, the Court concluded that there was "a
reasonable possibility" that Turner had obtained the cocaine from a
legally stamped package.72 Earlier in the opinion it was noted that thefts
from stamped packages were much less than the total smuggled. 3 This
fact, plus the Court's willingness to find only "a reasonable possibility"
that Turner had obtained the drug from legal sources, leads one to
conclude that the presumption could have passed the "more likely than
67. Id. at 415-16.
68. Id. at 416.
69. Id. at 418.
70. Id. at 419.
71. Id. at 422.
72. Id. at 423-24.
73. Id. at 419.
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not" test. If this is the case, then the Court in Turner requires that "the
sufficiency of the rational connection between the basic facts and the
presumed fact must be judged by the 'beyond a reasonable doubt'
test.""
Shortly after Turner was decided, the Court again hinted that it
might be redefining "rational connection" in terms of the reasonable
doubt standard. In Sussman v. United States,75 the Court vacated the
judgment and remanded a conviction for receiving illegally imported
gum opium for further consideration in light of Turner.7" Sussman was
convicted under the same statute as Turner, which included a presump-
tion inferring knowledge of the drug's illegal importation from unex-
plained possession. In Turner, it was noted that the opium poppy is not
legally or illegally being cultivated in this country.77 The Court also
observed that opium cannot be legally imported except for medical and
scientific purposes.7" While some opium is being stolen from legitimate
sources, it constitutes less than .01 percent of all the opium being law-
fully imported. The Court could have concluded from this that, judged
by the "more likely than not" test, a jury could validly infer that ille-
gally possessed gum opium is a smuggled narcotic. That it did not so
hold suggests again a redefinition of the "rational connection" to mean
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The failure of the Supreme Court to expressly redefine the rational
connection test to require an inference beyond a reasonable doubt, its
frequent reference to the "more likely than not test," and its dicta in
Tot that a rational connection could be less than an inference beyond a
reasonable doubt,79 leaves open the question of how "rational connec-
tion" will be defined in future cases. Therefore, we will next discuss what
level of proof is constitutionally required to sustain a statutory criminal
presumption.
RATIONAL CONNECTIONS AND PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
The rational connection test is a product of a civil dispute. It was
created by the Supreme Court in a 1910 civil case, Mobile, Jackson &
74. Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View,
1970 DUKE L.J. 919, 923 (1970).
75. 397 U.S. 43 (1970).
76. The Court earlier had sustained a similar presumption as applied to opium in Yee Hem
v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
77. 396 U.S. at 412-13.
78. Id. at 413.
79. The Court stated that a presumption could be "created upon a view of relation broader
than a jury might take in a specific case." 319 U.S. at 468.
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Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed.0 The case involved an action for
negligence over the death of a railroad employee killed in a derailment.
The statute in Turnipseed provided that proof of an injury inflicted by
the operation of railroad cars would be prima facie evidence of negli-
gence by the railroad. The railroad attacked the presumption arguing
that it was a denial of due process and equal protection. That statute
required the railroad to prove due care in its operations, while the
plaintiff in any other negligence case had to prove negligence by the
defendant. Holding the presumption constitutional, the Court said:
That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of
another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a
denial of equal protection of the law, it is only essential that
there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one
fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to
be a purely arbitrary mandate."'
It was not until 1925 that the rational connection test first appeared
in a criminal context. Quoting the language in Turnipseed, the Court
in Yee Hem v. United States" held constitutional a statute which pre-
sumed that any possessor of opium knew it to be unlawfully imported.
Turnipseed was also cited with approval by the Court in Tot when it
declared the rational connection test to be the "controlling" standard
for judging statutory criminal presumptions.83
It is generally felt that civil standards of proof cannot be applied
in a criminal setting."4 A civil standard of proof is simply inappropriate
in a proceeding to determine whether criminal sanctions should be im-
posed upon the accused.85 The "more likely than not" standard is
roughly equivalent to the preponderance of evidence standard. The test
is therefore more than satisfactory in a civil context, but its application
in a criminal matter can only be justified if it does not conflict with the
reasonable doubt standard."
80. 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
81. Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
82. 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
83. 319 U.S. at 469 n.9.
84. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). See also Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947); Isbell v. United States, 227 F. 788 (8th Cir. 1915).
But cf United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956).
85. See notes 15-24 supra and accompanying text.
86. The test must not conflict with other constitutional protections such as the right against
self-incrimination and the right to a jury trial if its use in a criminal context is to be justified. These
constitutional issues will not be treated in this paper. For an analysis of these issues see Comment,
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The concept of guilt is not a single entity, but is made up of a
"complex of elements."" Thus, to establish the defendant's guilt, the
prosecution must prove each element ("every fact" 8 ) of the crime be-
yond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore incumbent that when proof of
a crime is aided by a presumption, the presumed fact must not receive
less evidentiary treatment than other facts constituting the crime. If the
jury believe that one element of the crime has not been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, but return a verdict of guilty because they feel the
entire case is persuasive beyond a reasonable doubt, their inconsistency
reflects a serious misunderstanding of the concepts of guilt and proof
of its weakest element. An overwhelmingly persuasive argument as to
one fact does not make up for an unpersuasive argument as to another
fact, nor does it eliminate the residual doubt as to that fact. One court
has said:
No authority in any relevant context has ever suggested that
the statutory inference was intended, or may properly serve, to
lighten the prosecution's burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. On the contrary, it is routine and standard practice...
to instruct the jury (or to hold at a bench trial) that no convic-
tion may be had unless the prosecution has proved each ele-
ment of the offense. . . beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . And
so when we allow the drawing of an inference like the type
herein [sic] issue, we must be telling juries (or ourselves as
triers of fact) that the inference is one sustained by substan-
tially more than a preponderance of the evidence, that the
probability is far in excess of 50-50, that is sufficient to warrant
a reasonable man's being convinced "to a moral certainty" of
the correctness of the inference.89
The "more likely than not" test permits presumptions when the
evidence supporting the presumption is sufficient to justify a belief that
the presumed fact follows from proof of the operative fact in at least a
Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Reconciling the Practical with the Sacrosanct, 18 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 157 (1970); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 341 (1970); Comment. The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 141 (1966).
87. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 138 (1968).
88. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), the Court used the language "every fact
necessary to constitute the crime" rather than every element of the crime. Whether this difference
is one of substance or form is not important for our purposes. Clearly, when dealing with presumed
"facts" the analysis does not turn on whether a presumed fact is a "fact necessary to constitute
the crime" or an element of the crime.
89. United States v. Adams, 293 F. Supp. 776, 783-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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preponderance of the cases. A trier of fact that can say only that it is
more likely than not that a fact necessary to the crime exists cannot say
that the fact exists beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the "more likely
than not" test allows a case to reach the jury even though the evidence
supporting one of the facts of the crime-the presumed fact-is insuffi-
cient to sustain a conclusion that the fact exists beyond a reasonable
doubt.10 In addition to permitting the jury to receive the case, the "more
likely than not" test induces the jury to find that the presumed fact
exists beyond a reasonable doubt in any particular case on the basis of
a general legislative determination that the presumed fact follows from
proof of the operative fact in at least 51 percent of the cases." This
injects caprice into the trial by directing the court, and often the jury,
to treat something as proven to a moral certainty when in fact it has
not been.
The Supreme Court, save for Justices Black and Douglas," has
discounted this argument through an analysis known as the "permissible
inference doctrine." In United States v. Gainey13 and later in Turner
v. United States,94 the Court explained that statutory criminal presump-
tions only permit the jury to infer the existence of the presumed fact
from proof of the operative fact-they are not required to do so. Thus,
if the jury finds that the presumption does not prove a material element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, they may acquit.
The weakness in this analysis is twofold. First, as mentioned
above, 95 a statutory criminal presumption meeting the "more likely than
not" standard sends a case to the jury where the evidence is insufficient
to allow a rational juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In such
a case, the accused would normally be entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal. 6
Second, the presumption induces the jury to find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt upon proof of the operative fact. The "permissible
inference doctrine" is predicated upon the existence of two distinct prop-
ositions in the jury instructions: (1) that the jury must be convinced
90. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
91. See note 96 infra and accompanying text.
92. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 71-88 (1965); Turner v. United States, 396
U.S. 398, 425-34 (1970). Justices Black and Douglas dissented in both cases.
93. 380 U.S. 63, 70 (1965).
94. 396 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1970).
95. See notes 41 and 90 supra and accompanying text.
96. Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837
(1947); Early v. United States, 394 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1968); Goldstein, The State and the
Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1157 (1960).
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beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the
crime, and (2) that they may infer from proof of the operative fact the
existence of the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. If the defen-
dant does not present evidence to negate the presumed fact, it stands to
reason that the jury, troubled over the meaning of "reasonable doubt,"
will cling to the one certain piece of information they have-a legislative
determination of what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even if the defendant presents evidence to negate the existence of the
presumed fact, the jury will be inclined to ask if the defendant's evidence
raises a reasonable doubt about the existence of the presumed fact
rather than to look to the prosecution's evidence and ask if it proves the
existence of the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Professors
Ashford and Risiner provide an excellent analysis worth quoting:
Generally [the jury] are not certain as to what is meant by
certainty "beyond a reasonable doubt." We believe that the
very force and value of this term springs from this uncertainty
on the part of jurors. The decisions of fact which most individu-
als make in every day life are generally based on what is more
likely than not. . . . The term "beyond a reasonable doubt"
is just difficult enough to comprehend as a concept to break
through this everyday behavioral pattern of decision-making
standards. More important, it forces the individual juror to
ponder the question of how the law wants to decide, and to
examine his own soul . . to answer the question of whether
or not he is as sure as the law requires him to be. It is intended
to make even the juror who thinks that the defendant "did it,"
in everyday terms, think twice.
[When instructed as to a statutory presumption], however,
the jury knows of one thing for certain that it usually does not
know, a factor which may seriously reduce the impact of the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. They know
that the fact proved constitutes sufficient evidence in the eyes
of the law to justify a finding of the fact presumed beyond a
reasonable doubt. We believe that a jury, having found [the
operative fact], and having been informed that a finding of [the
presumed fact] is correct in the eyes of the law, will quite
naturally look to see if there is any reason to find [the pre-
sumed fact]. If there is no evidence which tends to show that
the presumed fact does not exist, they will all but inevitably
find [the presumed fact]. Thus, while it is true that under the
instructions the jury must decide that [the presumed fact] has
1973]
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been proven beyond a reasonable doubt or else find [that the
presumed fact does not exist], the instructions have left no
doubt in their minds that [finding the presumed fact] is the
correct result.97
This shift in the focus of the jury's inquiry is inconsistent with the
presumption of innocence. It is the responsibility of the prosecution to
prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a
process is constitutionally required in order to overcome the presump-
tion of innocence. Statutory criminal presumptions, on the other hand,
tend to undermine this concept by encouraging the jury to inquire
whether the accused has created a reasonable doubt as to the existence
of an element of the crime. Thus, the presumption of innocence is
modified to a presumption of guilt, and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is modified to the requirement that the accused raise a reasonable
doubt.
An accused in a criminal prosecution must be acquitted if his guilt
is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence
is not overcome by a probability that the accused committed a crime. 8
The "more likely than not" test does not adequately protect this pre-
sumption of innocence. Such a test often permits a prosecutor to get his
case to the jury without producing any evidence, other than operative
facts underlying the presumption, pertaining to a material element of
the crime. The standard permits the jury to receive a case and return a
verdict of guilty when the evidence is insufficient to justify a belief that
each element of the crime has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
A statutory criminal presumption "must be regarded as 'irrational'
or 'arbitrary', and hence unconstitutional,"1 9 if there is a reasonable
doubt as to the inference of the presumed fact from proof of the opera-
tive fact on which it is made to depend. 00
97. Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Criminal Cases:
A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 198-99 (1969).
98. See Wolf v. United States, 238 F. 902, 906 (4th Cir. 1916).
99. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
100. A few state courts have reached a similar conclusion. State v. Reynolds, 28 Wis. 2d
350, 359, 137 N.W.2d 14, 19 (1965); State v. Edards, 269 Minn. 343, 348, 130 N.W.2d 623, 626
(1964); State v. Kennedy, 15 Wis. 2d 600, 612, 113 N.W.2d 372, 379 (1962); State v. Mix, 211
La. 865, 872, 31 So. 2d 1, 4 (1947).
Should the above conclusion be accepted by the Supreme Court, the legislatures may be
expected to circumvent the mandate as much as possible. They may, for example, attempt to
eliminate the presumed fact from the corpus delecti of the crime, which would achieve the same
result as the statutory presumption.
The legislatures have a great deal of latitude in this respect. Constitutional limitations on their
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CONCLUSION
A "more likely than not" rule is germane to civil litigation but is
inappropriate when used to measure the constitutionality of a statutory
criminal presumption. Our political and legal systems declare freedom
to be the underlying postulate of their structure. Based on this tradi-
tional regard for individual freedom, our criminal law presumes the
innocence of every person charged with crime. Before the state can
impose criminal punishment, it must first overcome this presumption by
proving beyond a reasonable doubt every fact making up his guilt.
The difficulty that this requirement imposes is not insubstantial,
but it rests upon sound and clearly defined principles. It is this practical
difficulty of proof, not a change in the underlying principles of the
presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard, that has
led to the improper use of presumptions in our criminal law. Difficulties
of proof are legitimate justifications for creating statutory civil pre-
sumptions-but not criminal presumptions.
power to employ criminal sanctions are minimal and ill-defined. Professor Hart wrote that the
"legislature's sense of justice" has been the prime constitutional limitation on the use of the
criminal sanction where an offense has been related to a Bill of Rights protection. Hart, The Aims
of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 411 (1958).
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